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Abstract: Entailment is an interesting sigmatoid: It should mean one thing, but it means another, just for starters. When used 
in Mathematics, it is usually with the sense of saying that something is definitely true. That would be the use in Classical Logic 
then. When used in Logic, it became something else. Now it was about how the logical system, which can be any nonclassical 
one, could be making a proposition become true or false. The major issue we found in 2000, when learning from the own 
nonclassicists what they do, was that they talk about Nonclassical Logic, therefore a way of thinking that is not Cartesian, yet 
they stick to the notion of entailment we use in Mathematics, and therefore to the Classical Logic ways. We here discuss 
exactly this. 
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1. Introduction 
From (Pinheiro, 2016), we read the following: 
 
Figure 1. Two notions of validity, Priest. 
When we have nothing to the left side followed by the 
symbol |=, and then a proposition, what is usually meant is 
that we have a tautology to the right, that is, something that is 
true in all interpretations that are allowed in the system 
(Johnstone, 1987). 
Some authors, such as Johnstone (1987), say that that is 
the same as having {} |=, and then the proposition, what then 
mean that we need no propositions to support a tautology. 
An interpretation is a set of truth-values being assigned to 
the propositions under consideration. If we have the empty 
set to the left side, we obviously do not have to assign truth-
values to any proposition, so that the antecedent of the 
entailment becomes automatically true (vacuum rule 
perhaps). 
The implication is that if we have that all the 
interpretations that make what is to the left side, which we 
are calling antecedent (Introduction, 2004), true also make 
what is to the right side true, and that is what we are calling 
consequent (Introduction, 2004), then whatever is to left 
entails whatever is to the right. 
If the consequent is always true for any interpretation we 
choose, what has to be true for tautologies, and there is no 
interpretation to be considered in terms of antecedent, we 
should probably have a conflict, but the decision is that in 
vacuum, OK. That probably comes from the fact that for us 
to falsify an implication in Classical Logic (CL), there is only 
one way: antecedent is true, consequent is false. If we 
guarantee that the consequent is true, then the implication 
will always be true, like regardless of the antecedent. 
Nonclassical Logic has been created by the revolutionary: 
They wanted CL to be used ALSO in real life. In real life, 
people have doubts, so that something might be true, and 
false at the same time for at least some amount of time. True, 
and false were not enough in this case. 
Nonclassical Logic came to pervert the rules from 
Classical Logic, therefore, to basically promote revolution in 
it: Why are you Cartesian in what regards gender? We have 
men, women, and middle-sex. When we want to assign a 
truth-value to a sentence of the type I am a woman, we will 
be in trouble if the person is from the middle-sex. Accept a 
maybe instead of a true or false, and it is all fixed. 
Another scholar found a fourth way to go, and there was 
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another system, Fuzzy Logic (Rouse, 2016) came up with 
infinitely many, and so on. 
What we find most interesting however is that they want to 
use, according to Priest (2001), the same notion of entailment 
that we use in Mathematics, and therefore in CL. Do half the 
work, and say you did the same, basically. 
We think we are sure they should at least have thought for 
longer about it, so perhaps they should have produced a 
paper on the topic, some book chapters, and whatever else to 
show that they have thought about it. 
Intuitively, the concept of entailment would have to adapt 
to the logical system we have at hand, so that if we have a 
three-valued system, so say that we have the truth-values A, 
B, and C, and rules that perhaps agglutinate to the left side of 
the entailment, so say two values to the left give the same 
result in the end if the right side keeps its value, so say A, 
and B to one side, and A to the other would still give us OK 
or A, we would have to at least write that in the definition of 
entailment, it seems. In this case, instead of whatever 
interpretation makes the left side become true, we should 
have whatever interpretation makes the left side become true 
or middle-value, like to the least. 
In this paper, we try to discuss this interesting concept, of 
entailment, and propose that nonclassicists think more about 
the topic or expose what they have already discussed in a 
way for us to understand that they have already thought 
enough about it. 
2. Development 
So, if we had only one proposition, say P: x belongs to the 
reals, and we wanted to know if that entailed that Q: x+2=5 
=> x=3, we would have to play the following game: Assume 
that v(P) = 1. Now we know that x does belong to the reals. 
With this, we know that v(Q) = 1 as well. Therefore, P |= Q. 
If instead we had P: x belongs to the interval (7,10), we 
would know that Q would be true in the same way because 
both antecedent, and consequent of the implication would be 
false, what gives us a true implication, so that we would have 
v(P)=1 => v(Q)=1, and therefore P |= Q. 
That is counter-intuitive in all. Perhaps we should revise 
the definition of entailment even in terms of Classical Logic. 
Some people have discussed semantic 
intersection/connection in terms of entailment, and even 
implication (Mares, 1998) at waste, however, and nothing 
that could add seems to have been found. 
It makes some sense to believe that if by making the left 
side true we get the right side true, then we have an 
entailment. 
Entailment is defined in the following way (Harper, 2001): 
 
Figure 2. Etymology of the word Entailment. 
We then understand that it should mean the creation of a 
legal limitation. Since the logical system has rules, we can 
take those to be laws, and then say that if A entails B, then A 
provokes the appearance of a limitation for B. 
If nothing appears to the left side, we understand there are 
no limitations, and that is when we say we have a tautology 
to the right side of the symbol |=, so that it is all making a lot 
of sense so far. 
If this is the actual sense of entails, then the nonclassicists 
could be right in using it for their nonclassical systems 
without adapting or changing anything, but they then would 
probably have to stop saying that whatever makes the left 
side true would have to make the right side true. 
The right way of putting it would probably be: If the left 
side does not bring any opposition to whatever is on the right 
side, then we have an entailment. 
Now we can accept that any contradiction, and nothing 
would be the same, since it would not impose any limitation 
to the right side. Up to this date, however, we thought that 
there was a bit of confusion, since contradictions would not 
be true in CL. 
If the left side said that A was zero, so say A=0, then the 
right side could not bring A=2, we assume. 
There is a bit of confusion in the literature, however. 
Allan (2010) let us know that 
 
Figure 3. Encyclopedia, Entails, definition. 
In this case, the source claims that (1b) does not entail 
(1a). (1b) says that no students laughed loudly, and (1a) says 
that no students laughed. If no students laughed loudly, we 
are not saying that no student laughed, quite trivially, but (1a) 
would be a restriction on (1b), a limitation, like we would 
have reduced the group of students that laughed even further, 
so that, in our point of view, that would have been a 
limitation. (1b) does not limit (1a), it is the opposite, so that 
we here would think that all is agreeing with the just 
 Mathematics Letters 2016; 2(4): 28-31 30 
 
proposed new definition for entailment, since (1a) does entail 
(1b) according to the source. 
It also claims that (2a) does not entail (2b). (2b) says that 
every philosopher smokes heavily. (2a) says that every 
philosopher smokes. (2b) would clearly be a restriction on 
(2a), therefore a limitation, so that (2b) does entail (2a). On 
the other hand, (2a) would not entail (2b) if we consider our 
new definition, since (2a) is not limiting (2b), it is the 
opposite. 
The source seems to have the same understanding we just 
acquired here: Limitations are what entails, a reduction in the 
domain provoked by the left side of the relationship we 
analyse. 
From (Stanford, 2016), comes the following extract: 
Logical Entailment 
We say that a sentence φ logically entails a sentence ψ 
(written φ |= ψ) if and only if every truth assignment that 
satisfies φ also satisfies ψ. More generally, we say that a 
set of sentences ∆ logically entails a sentence ψ (written ∆ 
|= ψ) if and only if every truth assignment that satisfies all 
of the sentences in ∆ also satisfies ψ. 
For example, the sentence p logically entails the sentence 
(p ∨ q). Since a disjunction is true whenever one of its 
disjuncts is true, then (p ∨ q) must be true whenever p is 
true. On the other hand, the sentence p does not logically 
entail (p ∧ q). A conjunction is true if and only if both of 
its conjuncts are true, and q may be false. Of course, any 
set of sentences containing both p and q does logically 
entail (p ∧ q). 
Note that the relationship of logical entailment is a purely 
logical one. Even if the premises of a problem do not 
logically entail the conclusion, this does not mean that the 
conclusion is necessarily false, even if the premises are 
true. It just means that it is possible that the conclusion is 
false. 
Once again, consider the case of (p ∧ q). Although p does 
not logically entail this sentence, it is possible that both p 
and q are true and, therefore, (p ∧ q) is true. However, the 
logical entailment does not hold because it is also possible 
that q is false and, therefore, (p ∧ q) is false. 
Note also that logical entailment is not the same as logical 
equivalence. The sentence p logically entails (p ∨	 q), but 
(p ∨ q) does not logically entail p. Logical entailment is 
not analogous to arithmetic equality; it is closer to 
arithmetic inequality. 
This definition matches that of Dr. Priest (2001), and 
fellows, but is completely different from the definition we 
see in (Allan, 2010). 
So, they say that p entails p or q. We may think that we 
can replace their definition of entailment with an implication: 
p -> p or q. Notwithstanding, seeing things from closer, we 
would get antecedent false validating the implication as well, 
but they reduce it all to antecedent true with consequent true, 
so that we only have one case of the three allowed cases in 
the implication when it comes to their entailment: It is 
something apart. 
Harper (2001) gives us the sense have consequences or 
inseparable connection as an alternative, and he mentions 
that this sense appeared in the year of 1829. 
If the sense is to have consequences, then the left side of 
the entailment would have as a consequence the right side, 
what is then compatible with the definition we find in 
Stanford (2016), and is also compatible with the definition 
we find in (Allan, 2010), considering the examples he there 
gives. 
Now, this thing of being true to one side leading to all 
being true to the other or not imposing a situation in which 
the other side would not be true, is actually connected to the 
only way to falsify an implication in CL, which is antecedent 
true when consequent isn’t. 
We are only using two possible truth-values here, true, and 
false, and therefore we are obviously using CL. 
Notwithstanding, Fuzzy Logic would have an infinity of 
possible truth-values, and we perhaps would need to consider 
those when talking about entailment inside of that system. 
That is actually the point of this paper. 
As we go from CL to nonclassical systems, we should 
probably also find new definitions for entailment, and not 
only for validity. 
Hajek (2002) says that 
The standard set of truth degrees is the real interval [0, 1] 
with its natural ordering ≤ (1 standing for absolute truth, 0 
for absolute falsity); but one can work with different 
domains, finite or infinite, linearly or partially ordered. 
Truth functions of connectives have to behave classically 
on the extremal values 0,1. 
He is talking about Fuzzy Logic. 
We read (Priest, 2001), and found only one definition of 
entailment, which is the one we present here. It is possible 
that that is wrong because if you are changing your truth 
values, and instead of two you now have even infinitely 
many, you would have to change the way you think of 
entailment for it all to make sense, like true, and false was for 
CL. 
We could then have, in the case of Fuzzy Logic, that 
whatever makes the left side receive a truth-value between 
0.5, and 1 makes the right side receive a truth-value between 
0.5, and 1 instead. 
We feel that what they shouldn’t have changed they did 
change, which is the concept of Completeness (Pinheiro, 
2016), and what they should have changed, they didn’t 
change, which is the concept of entailment. 
3. Conclusion 
Nonclassicists would have to come up with articles to at 
least justify their choices in terms of the definition of 
entailment: If they change truth-values, that should provoke a 
change also in terms of the definition of entailment, since 
that definition comes attached to truth-values. The definition 
says that whatever makes the antecedent true would have to 
make the consequent true for us to have an entailment. 
It is possible that they would have to present a new 
definition of entailment for each nonclassical system that be 
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not bivalent. 
Here we have the opposite to what we had when we talked 
about Completeness (Pinheiro, 2016): We should be 
changing everything that has been created for CL. 
Not entering details on how Fuzzy Logic has been used or 
defined so far, just talking about truth-values, it could be that 
we would have to say that entailment in Fuzzy Logic is only 
justified if both antecedent, and consequent are marked with 
a value that is between 0.5, and 1. 
It seems that the best translation for the symbol |= is have 
consequences or inseparable connection. Perhaps the best 
way to word it would be has as a consequence. 
In this way, if X |= Y, X has, as a consequence, Y. 
This is something different from the implication because, 
in terms of CL, for instance, if the antecedent of the 
implication is evaluated as false, and the consequent as true, 
the implication is true, but, with the entailment, we only 
accept true to both sides as a way to validate the relationship. 
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